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The Pre-History of  
Piracy as a Crime &  
Its Definitional Odyssey 
Michael J. Kelly* 
The legal definition of piracy has fluctuated throughout the 
centuries to account for both the methods of the perpetrators 
and the power of the state. The heinous nature of the act usually 
meant pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction, but what 
constitutes the act itself has ranged from straightforward 
robbery at sea to, recently, violence at sea that includes 
engaging in acts of political protest. The modern trend of 
employing an expansive “violent attacks at sea” definition is 
appealing because of its ability to account for a wide variety of 
conduct in a wide variety of contexts. But the consequences of 
such an approach include a risk of returning to past experiences 
where political expediency was prioritized over due process. 
States should instead consider ways to implement a uniform and 
appropriate approach to this scourge, and the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea provides one way to do so. 
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I.  Introduction 
“There is none of you but will hang me, I know, 
whenever you can clinch me within your power.”  
—The Pirate Bartholomew Roberts, a.k.a. Black Bart1 
2 
 
How is it that a Somali national engaged in piracy against a Saudi 
vessel on the high seas off the Horn of Africa can be seized by a 
French warship and taken to a national court in Nairobi, Kenya to 
stand trial?3 Because he’s a pirate! This same logic applies in other 
instances: How is it that a German national implicated in the 
 
1. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES: FROM THEIR 
FIRST RISE AND SETTLEMENT IN THE ISLAND OF PROVIDENCE, TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 235 (2d ed. 1724), available at http://www. 
gutenberg.org/files/40580/40580-h/40580-h.htm. Bartholomew Roberts 
(1682-1722) was “[t]he most successful raider in the history of piracy, he 
took prisoner an astounding 470 vessels, and so renowned was his 
ferocity that many of those ships were surrendered to him without a 
fight.” Christopher Hudson, The Real Jack Sparrow: He Would Have 
Eaten Johnny Depp for Breakfast, DAILY MAIL (May 26, 2007), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-457724/The-Real-Jack-
Sparrow-He-eaten-Johnny-Depp-breakfast.html. 
2. Joe Cas, The Jolly Roger, HOIST YOUR COLORS, (Nov. 24, 2010), 
http://hoistyourcolors.com/the-jolly-roger/#more-193 (showing the 
ensign of Black Bart).  
3. See Jeffrey Gettleman, The West Turns to Kenya as Piracy Criminal 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A8, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/04/24/world/africa/24kenya.html?_r=1& (“Kenya is 
emerging as the venue of choice for piracy cases and an important piece 
of the worldwide crackdown on piracy. The spate of recent hijackings off 
Somalia’s coast has stiffened international resolve. . . . [P]iracy suspects 
are getting a one-way ticket to Mombasa . . . where Kenyan officials are 
all too eager to punish the seafaring thugs imperiling their vital shipping 
industry. Under recent, innovative agreements with the United States, 
Britain and the European Union, Kenya has promised to try piracy 
suspects apprehended by foreign navies. In return, the other countries 
have agreed to improve Kenya’s antiquated courts.”).  
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Holocaust could be seized by Israeli agents outside Buenos Aires, 
Argentina and spirited back to Jerusalem to stand trial?4 Because he’s 
a Nazi! Slave traders, genocidaires, war criminals, torturers and 
others are treated similarly.5 
At first blush, the implication is that criminal jurisdiction stems 
from who one is—but the more accurate description is that 
jurisdiction stems from what one has done. “Application of universal 
jurisdiction is predicated largely on the notion that some crimes are so 
heinous that they offend the interest of all humanity, and, indeed, 
imperil civilization itself,”6 and piracy has long been considered the 
grandfather of universal crimes.7 As such, any state, anywhere in the 
world, can prosecute a pirate even if that state has no connection 
whatsoever to the underlying acts the defendant has committed.8 
All pirates know this, as reflected in the eighteenth century 
admission of Black Bart. Although it should be noted that the basis 
for universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy has shifted through 
the ages. The original rationale for universal jurisdiction over pirates 
sprang from the locus of the crime—the high seas. No state had 
jurisdiction extending from its coastal waters into the common area of 
the high seas, and so every state was granted jurisdiction over pirates 
if it could catch them.9 Now, as piracy is recognized as a jus cogens 
peremptory norm, the universal jurisdiction rationale springs from the 
conduct itself. Universal jurisdiction over jus cogens conduct is drawn 
 
4. ANDREA BIRDSALL, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION 52–55 (2009). 
5. See id. at 47 (“Jus cogens offences create the possibility of universal 
jurisdiction by individual states.”); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 
II, at 207 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008) (noting that genocide, 
war crimes, and slavery are jus cogens crimes). 
6. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, VOL. II, supra note 5, at 207. 
7. See id. at 169; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 791 (1988). 
8. See MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPANSION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR 
PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2005). 
9. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 n.83 (Richard 
Henry Dana ed., 8th ed. 1866) (“[A] pirate jure gentium can be seized 
and tried by any nation, irrespective of his national character, or of that 
of the vessel on board which, against which, or from which, the act was 
done. The reason of this must be, that the act is one over which all 
nations have equal jurisdiction. This can result only from the fact, that 
it is committed where all have a common, and no nation an exclusive, 
jurisdiction—i.e., upon the high seas; and, if on board ship, and by her 
own crew, then the ship must be one in which no national authority 
reigns.”).  
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from the heinous nature of the act.10 This theoretical shift from the 
geographic location of the crime to the nature of the crime as the 
basis for universal jurisdiction over the crime questions the efficacy of 
continuing to insist that piracy can only occur on the high seas. 
But what qualifies as piracy, and how did it come to be the first 
scourge of mankind enshrined as the oldest international crime 
amenable to universal jurisdiction? This article looks astern, back to 
the pre-history of piracy, to discover the criminalization and evolving 
definition of the act. It then provides a case study of the definition’s 
transformation over a span of 222 years in the United States. Many 
interesting jurisdictional issues are discussed by other authors in this 
symposium volume, so questions of jurisdiction are not addressed in 
depth here. 
Piracy, at bottom, is nothing more than robbery. However, when 
robbery occurs on land, it is fairly evident which governmental power 
can punish it. When robbery occurs at sea or in the air, where people 
are more vulnerable, the act is considered more heinous and, as such, 
the actor is subject to any government’s power to punish him. Thus, 
jurisdictional dilemmas are neatly resolved. However, different 
national jurisdictions may not all use an accepted international 
definition of piracy. Indeed, they may have wildly divergent 
definitions on their books, and this variance can change—and 
ultimately determine—the fate of an alleged pirate. 
So let’s start at the beginning.  
II.  The Evolving Definition of Piracy 
Piracy has been with us since men first set sail.11 Or, as one judge 
from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea put it, “[t]he 
very first time something valuable was known to be leaving a beach 
on a raft the first pirate was around to steal it.”12 Historically, as 
maritime commerce grew, so did incidents of piracy. A state’s ability 
to escort merchant shipping with warships to ward off pirates was 
necessarily limited during times of peace and especially so during 
times of war. Consequently, harsh and quite rigid rules against piracy 
were developed as an additional deterrent. 
The Rhodian Sea Laws were the first attempt at codifying 
maritime law, which consisted of the customs that long outdated this 
 
10. See id. at 207 (stating that in order for piracy to qualify as a 
“universal” crime, it must violate a “legal standard of morality,” which 
is evidenced by the laws, treaties, and practices of states). 
11. See José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and 
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 
364 (2003). 
12. Id. (quoting J.A. GOTTSCHALK ET AL., JOLLY ROGER WITH AN UZI: THE 
RISE AND THREAT OF MODERN PIRACY 11 (2000)). 
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effort by the Greeks between 800 and 900 B.C.13 As Arab and Slavic 
piracy increased, the Sea Laws not only extended universal 
jurisdiction over brigands14 but also regulated losses and “served as a 
form of insurance, dividing the cost of the losses between the ship 
owner, the owners of the cargo, and the passengers.”15 Later adopted 
and extended by the Romans and Byzantines, these provisions were 
still in place in some form; for instance, when Julius Caesar was 
captured by pirates as a boy in 78 B.C. and later ransomed.16 Even 
the Catholic Church condemned piracy in the Third Lateran Council 
in 1179 and placed pirates “under penalty of excommunication, but, 
characteristically enough, only if it was committed against 
Christians.”17 
Although most of the ancient sea codes are lost to the mists of 
time, later efforts to regulate maritime law in the Middle Ages 
included the extension of universal jurisdiction over pirates at sea, 
hearkening back to Cicero’s admonition in the late Roman Republic 
era that pirates were:  
“[E]nemies” of all societies (hostes humani generis), implying 
that these law-breakers were in a constant state of war with 
civilization as a whole. Conferring this unique legal status upon 
robbers (praedones) at sea indicates how seriously the problem 
of piracy was taken by Rome, as also by the Chinese 
Empire . . . . 
The notion that piracy was subject to “universal” 
jurisdiction . . . is reflected in numerous international laws 
compiled in the West in ancient times. These laws included: 
the . . . Rhodian Sea Law . . . Rolls of Oleron [12th Century]; 
the North European ordinances associated with the Hanseatic 
League, which grew out of the Sea Laws of Wisby in the 
13th Century; and the subsequent Consolato del Mare [11th to 
13th Centuries] . . . . 
 
13. Gordon W. Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of 
Uniformity in International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1068 
(1983). 
14. See DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD 
ORDER: THE TOWER AND THE ARENA 401 (2008). 
15. Rhodian Sea Law, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica. 
com/EBchecked/topic/501661/Rhodian-Sea-Law/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2014). 
16. Jesus, supra note 11, at 364. 
17. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 30–31 
(3d ed. 1961). 
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. . . Gentili [1552-1608] was the first of the early modern jurists 
to argue that piracy was forbidden under the law of nations: 
that is, under public international law. His argument was that 
all takings at sea were illegal under the law of nations unless 
authorized by a sovereign ruler [thereby leaving room for 
privateers] . . . .  
Grotius [1583-1645], however, took a narrower . . . view of the 
matter, arguing that the term “pirates” should be limited to 
those groups that have banded together solely for wrongdoing. 
Perhaps Grotius could not accept such groups as “natural” 
communities, but saw them falling rather under the category 
of . . . “organized crime.”18 
Interestingly, this seventeenth century disagreement between 
Gentili and Grotius over a broader or narrower definition of piracy is 
mirrored in twenty-first century American case law; two federal courts 
in the Eastern District of Virginia similarly split.19 In August 2010, 
U.S. District Judge Raymond Jackson dismissed a case against six 
Somali pirates who had attacked the warship USS Ashland.20 In so 
doing, Judge Jackson applied the definition of piracy as “robbery at 
sea,” which was crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1820 in United 
States v. Smith—the last time the United States had tried a formal 
piracy case.21 Ultimately, Judge Jackson found that the Somali 
defendants had neither successfully boarded nor robbed the Ashland.22 
Conversely, in October 2010, Judge Mark Davis determined that 
neither the boarding nor robbing requirements were relevant because 
the Ashland court had applied the wrong definition of piracy.23 In 
finding five Somali pirates guilty of committing piracy by attacking 
the warship USS Nicholas, Judge Davis instead applied the modern 
U.N. definition of piracy, codified in the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS): 
(a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
 
18. JOHNSTON, supra note 14, at 401. 
19. See Rodney Q. Fonda, Piracy from a Marine Insurance Perspective, 
9 BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL. (Matthew Bender & Co., Newark, N.J.), 
Jan. 2012, at 191, 192. 
20. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
21. Id. at 558–59; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
22. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
23. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 640–41 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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(i)  on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii)  against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a 
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it 
a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).24 
Judge Davis’ rationale underlying the preference for the 
international definition was that the definition of piracy in 
18 U.S.C. § 1651 could only be determined by referring to the modern 
law of nations. Consequently, the court had to use the “international 
consensus definition at the time of the alleged offense,”25 and not the 
international definition available in 1820 in the Smith case—which 
was robbery at sea. 
The “robbery at sea” definition of piracy is narrower, while the 
“violent attacks at sea” definition is more expansive. Resolving the 
district court split, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned Judge Jackson’s decision in the Ashland case, opting for 
the more expansive definition of piracy in the Nicholas case.26 
However, that is not the end of the story. American jurisprudence is 
casting the net for piracy under this broader violent attacks definition 
even wider.  
In 2013, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the 
Fourth Circuit’s lead. In Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd, the 
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, finding that 
environmental organization Sea Shepherd’s vigorous disruptive efforts 
to deny Japanese whaling ships of their prizes during seasonal hunts 
were piratical.27 The existence of a motive to steal, which was 
 
24. Id. at 619–20 (quoting U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force 
Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]). 
25. Id. at 623. 
26. United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 467, 469 (4th Cir. 2012). 
27. Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 708 
F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). In his majority opinion, Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski said of the environmental activists’ methods of disrupting 
Japanese whaling:  
You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships; 
hurl glass containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the 
water to damage propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs 
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determinative in the district court’s dismissal of the case, was deemed 
irrelevant.28 
Russia is likewise following suit. In September 2013, Greenpeace 
activists, protesting deployment of the first offshore oil platform in 
the Arctic Sea built to resist ice floes, were arrested by Russian 
authorities and are being subjected to a piracy investigation: 
Russian border guards seized the Greenpeace ship, the Arctic 
Sunrise, in international waters in the Pechora Sea on 
Thursday, a day after several members of the crew tried to 
board the Prirazlomnaya platform, which is operated by the 
Russian state energy giant Gazprom. 
The ship was towed to port in Murmansk, arriving on Tuesday. 
Its crew of 30, held incommunicado since the seizure, includes 
citizens of 18 countries, among them one American, raising the 
prospect of a diplomatic confrontation given the gravity of the 
piracy charges, which carry a sentence of up to 15 years in 
prison.29 
Is this really what pirates are? Anti-whaling or anti-drilling 
environmental groups? The states involved in such prosecutions could 
certainly be abusing the U.N.’s piracy definition to silence 
environmental protests and activism.30 Moreover, if it begins there, 
will human rights activism be next? Add to this the element of aiding 
and abetting, and the piracy definition becomes significantly broader.  
In 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Ali 
grafted aiding and abetting onto the piracy definition.31 In that case, a  
and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other 
ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how high-
minded you believe your purpose to be.  
 Id. at 1101. 
28. See id. at 1101–02 (holding that the district court erred in narrowly 
construing the “private ends” language in UNCLOS’ definition of piracy 
to cover purely financial gain, whereas multiple persuasive authorities 
support a finding that private ends may also “include those pursued on 
personal, moral, or philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s 
professed environmental goals”). 
29. Steven Lee Myers, Greenpeace Activists May Face Russian Piracy 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/25/world/europe/greenpeace-activists-face-possible-piracy-charges-in-
russia.html. 
30. See id. (“Russia announced . . . that it had opened a piracy 
investigation against the crew of a Greenpeace ship after its activists 
scaled an offshore oil platform last week. The step signaled that the 
authorities intended to act decisively to thwart more protests against 
Russia’s ambitious plans to expand energy exploration in the region.”). 
31. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 938, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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Somali national, Ali Mohamed Ali, was convicted of aiding and 
abetting piracy when he negotiated the release of a Danish merchant 
ship that had been captured by Somali pirates in exchange for a 
$1.7 million ransom, of which he received a $16,500 cut and a 
separate $75,000 payment that he demanded during the negotiations 
for his translation and negotiation services and which the ship owners 
wired to his bank account.32 
Ali was also nominally the Somali Education Minister.33 As such, 
he accepted an invitation to attend an education conference in the 
United States, where law enforcement was waiting to arrest him when 
he arrived at Dulles Airport.34 He was charged with conspiracy to 
commit piracy “in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes it a 
crime for ‘two or more persons’ to ‘conspire . . . to commit any offense 
against the United States,’” and aiding and abetting piracy under 
Section 2 of the same code, but not piracy itself.35 Judge Brown 
successfully found a home for the aiding and abetting charge in the 
“facilitating” language of the UNCLOS definition of piracy but could 
not do so for the conspiracy charge, which he determined the lower 
court correctly dropped.36 
While useful to go after financial backers of piracy and perhaps 
even account holders when proceeds are deposited, the aiding and 
abetting theory completely unleashed, although not as theoretically 
wide as conspiracy, can have unintended consequences. Can 
corporations aid and abet piracy? Perhaps a more nuanced definition 
of the “facilitating” clause, along the lines of Gentili, who excluded 
privateers from the definition 300 years ago, is in order. Although as 
legal persons, corporations in theory should be held to the same 
standards as natural persons with respect to criminal conduct.37 
Nineteenth century legal experts similarly wrestled with this 
question—although by then, stateless piracy had largely been 
eradicated.38 Nevertheless, there was always classically a direct 
correlation between piracy, robbery, and placement on the high seas. 
Oxford Professor Travers Twiss discussed piracy in his 1861 treatise, 
Law of Nations, precisely in those terms: 
 
32. Id. at 933. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 941. 
37. See generally Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide 
Under International Law, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 339 (2012) 
(imputing the legal status of corporate personhood to international 
criminal statutes that place liability on “persons”). 
38. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 128. 
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The High Seas are . . . nullius territorium, as not being subject 
to the exclusive Possession or Empire of any Nation. In another 
sense they may be called the common highway of 
Nations . . . seeing that all who navigate them are subject to a 
Common Law of Nations. . . . The maintenance of the peace of 
the Sea is one of the objects of that Common Law, and all 
offences against the peace of the Sea are offences against the 
Law of Nations, and of which all Nations may take cognizance. 
The robber equally with the murderer on the High Seas is 
technically a sea-felon or pirate, and every hand may be lawfully 
raised against him; he is, in fact, regarded as an enemy of the 
human race (hostis humani generis). The Pirate has no National 
character, and to whatever country he may have originally 
belonged, he is justiciable everywhere, being reputed out of the 
protection of all laws and privileges whatever.39 
However, once a pirate was within the territorial sea of a coastal 
state, he was within its exclusive jurisdiction.40 The breadth of the 
territorial sea was historically measured according to the distance by 
which the adjacent coastal state could defend it.41 For instance, the 
origin of the traditional three-mile wide territorial sea was the 
distance of a cannon shot.42 This lengthened over time to the twelve 
mile territorial sea that customary law and UNCLOS embrace today.43 
Beyond the jurisdictional constraints, there were generally 
accepted elements of the crime of piracy, even if there was 
disagreement on the application of those elements. William Manning’s 
1875 edition of the Law of Nations notes: 
The fact of there being such a crime as piracy has never been 
doubted since the Law of Nations acquired its modern form, nor 
have the chief elements of the crime been matter of doubt. The 
exact nature and number, however, of the offences 
comprehended by the term is still a matter of uncertainty, and 
the text-book writers have been in great perplexity in their 
search for a satisfactory definition. The characteristic elements 
in the crime of piracy are—(1) a violation, actual or attempted, 
of the general rights by sea of all States, whether in respect of 
persons or things; and (2) an absence of allegiance to any one 
 
39. TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT 
POLITICAL COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN 
TIMES OF PEACE 290 (2d ed. 1884). 
40. Id. at 291. 
41. Id. at 292. 
42. Fonda, supra note 19. 
43. UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 3, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400. 
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State, or an intention, actual or presumed, to establish an 
organisation subsisting by general rapine.44 
Much discussion then followed about whether the term piracy 
could be stretched to encompass slave-trading by ship—resolved 
finally by proposing that it could be so expanded by individual state 
criminal definitions.45 Henry Wheaton adds, “[t]he African slave-trade, 
though prohibited by the municipal laws of most nations, and 
declared to be piracy by the statutes of Great Britain and the United 
States, and [by treaty] Austria, Prussia and Russia, is not such by the 
general international law . . . .”46  
Theodore Woolsey agrees with this point in his 1878 treatise, 
International Law,47 but focuses his definition of piracy on three 
classes of persons committing the crime: 
Piracy is robbery on the sea, or by descent from the sea upon 
the coast, committed by persons not holding a commission from, 
or at the time pertaining to, any established state. It is the act 
(1) of persons who form an organization for the purposes of 
plunder . . . (2) of persons who, having in defiance of law seized 
possession of a chartered vessel, use it for purpose of robbery; 
(3) of persons taking a commission from two belligerent 
adversaries.48 
Wheaton, a decade earlier than Woolsey, dealt with both robbery 
and violence, as well as the nationality (or lack thereof) of the 
perpetrators: 
To constitute piracy jure gentium it is necessary, 1st, That the 
offence, being adequate in degree,—for instance robbery, 
destruction by fire, or other injury to persons or property,—
must be committed on the high seas, and not within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any nation; and, 2d, That the 
offenders, at the time of the commission of the act, should be in 
 
44. WILLIAM OKE MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 121 
(Sheldon Amos ed., 1875). 
45. Id. at 121–22. 
46. WHEATON, supra note 9, at 197–98. Mirroring the modern disagreement 
among lower federal courts on piracy’s definition, Wheaton notes that 
there was a similar split in the early nineteenth century with respect to 
whether slave-traders fell under the definition of piracy: “In the United 
States, there was a conflict in the inferior tribunals; but the Supreme 
Court, in The Antelope [23 U.S. 66 (1825)], decided that the [slave] 
trade was not piracy jure gentium.” Id. at 214 n.89. 
47. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 144 (5th ed. 1878). 
48. Id. 
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fact free from lawful authority, or should have made themselves 
so by their deed, or, as Sir L. Jenkins says (ii. 714), “out of the 
protection of all laws and privileges,” or, in the words of the 
Due de Broglie (Ecrits, i. 365), “qui n’ait ni feu ni lieu:” in 
short, they must be in the predicament of outlaws.49 
Whether the focus is on the perpetrator, the action, or the locus 
of the crime on the high seas, nuances in the definition of piracy 
waxed and waned over time as judges, scholars and governments 
attempted to fit unique “non-piratical” conduct (at least according to 
motive) into the legal definition of piracy. Like the dilemma with 
modern day maritime environmental activists, this effort was likely 
sometimes in good faith but other times may have been for political 
expediency, which would result in an abuse of the definition.  
Extending the definition of piracy to include rebels was one such 
practice, followed later by the U.S. government during the Civil War. 
For example: 
In 1873 a communalist insurrection broke out in the southeast 
of Spain, and the Spanish squadron stationed at Cartagena fell 
into the hands of the insurgents. The crews of the vessels 
composing the squadron were proclaimed pirates by the 
government of Madrid and it became necessary for states having 
vessels of war in the western Mediterranean to instruct the 
commanders as to the line of conduct to be adopted by them. 
Instructions were accordingly given by the governments of 
England, France and Germany [and] . . . naval commanders 
were ordered to allow freedom of action to the insurgent vessels 
so long as the lives or the property of subjects of their respective 
states were not threatened; the orders given to British officers 
differed only in directing interference in the case of danger to 
Italian as well as to English persons or property. If in the course 
of any interference which might be needed, Spanish persons or 
ships were captured, British commanders were to hand over 
their prisoners and the property seized to the agents of the 
government of Madrid. Thus, the piracy of the Cartagenians 
being political, no criminal jurisdiction was assumed over them; 
and though the right of summary action was asserted, its 
exercise was limited to the requirements of self-protection.50 
The current effort stretches the piracy definition even further. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision to graft aiding and abetting theory onto 
the piracy definition in Ali, referenced above, is but the latest 
example.  
 
49. WHEATON, supra note 9, at 194 n.83. 
50. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 
(A. Pearce Higgins ed., 7th ed. 1917). 
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The definitional journey of piracy as a crime in the United States 
is an interesting case study. Recall first that all the treatises on public 
international law were in accord on the proposition that there could 
be, and often was, a divergence between the definition of piracy 
according to the law of nations and that which was found in the 
municipal law of a state.51 
The American experience with the piracy definition has been an 
ongoing tussle between the legislature and the judiciary. The 
Constitution assigned the specific job of defining piracy to Congress,52 
which it did with the passage of the Crimes Act of 1790.53 Piracy was 
defined across five articles, with two key sections: 
§ 8 [I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, 
or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of 
any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence 
which if committed within the body of a county, would by the 
laws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any 
captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically 
and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods 
or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such 
ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall 
lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and 
prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to 
his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender 
shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, 
and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of 
crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where 
the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be 
brought.54 
§ 12 [I]f any seaman or other person shall commit manslaughter 
upon the high seas, or confederate, or attempt or endeavor to 
corrupt any commander, master, officer or mariner, to yield up 
or to run away with any ship or vessel, or with any goods, 
wares, or merchandise, or to turn pirate, or to go over to or 
confederate with pirates, or in any wise trade with any pirate 
 
51. Id. at 277 (“[The] municipal laws extending piracy beyond the limits 
assigned to it by international custom affect only the subjects of the 
state enacting them and foreigners doing the forbidden acts within its 
jurisdiction.”).  
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (providing Congress with the power “[t]o 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offenses against the Law of Nations”).  
53. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United 
States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). 
54. Id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 113–14. 
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knowing him to be such, or shall furnish such pirate with any 
ammunition, stores or provisions of any kind, or shall fit out 
any vessel knowingly and with a design to trade with or supply 
or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or if any 
person or persons shall any ways consult, combine, confederate 
or correspond with any pirate or robber on the seas, knowing 
him to be guilty of any such piracy or robbery; or if any seaman 
shall confine the master of any ship or other vessel, or endeavor 
to make a revolt in such ship . . . such person or persons so 
offending, and being thereof convicted, shall be imprisoned not 
exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand 
dollars.55 
The Crimes Act of 1790 delivers the classic “one, two punch” in 
that it criminalizes the underlying act of piracy in Section 8, 
mandating death, and then criminalizes the facilitation of piracy in 
Section 12, mandating fines and imprisonment for accomplices. 
The U.S. Supreme Court struggled with this definition, exempting 
its application within domestic waters56 or rivers that were not the 
high seas,57 and over American defendants.58 By 1819, Congress opted 
for a simpler definition with the passage of the Act to Protect the 
Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy, 
which redefined piracy in Section 5 such that: 
If any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, 
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, 
and such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into 
or found in the United States, every such offender or offenders 
shall, upon conviction . . . be punished by death.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted Congress’ lead this time and 
ruled in the oft-cited United States v. Smith case the following year 
that “piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that 
it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined” by the 1819 statute.60 
The matter seemed settled that customary international law would 
provide the definition.  
This was not an unknown tactic for Congress. It had, in the 1789 
Alien Tort Statute, provided for federal court jurisdiction over cases 
 
55. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 115. 
56. See United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 336, 339 (1818). 
57. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 77 (1820). 
58. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 633–34 (1818). 
59. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the 
Crime of Piracy, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819). 
60. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820).  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
The Pre-History of Piracy as a Crime & Its Definitional Odyssey 
39 
between foreign plaintiffs and foreign defendants involving “a tort 
only in violation of the law of nations.”61 As the law of nations 
evolved, so to would the definition of crimes or torts. This allowed for 
a convenient elasticity to such statutes that Congress could then leave 
to the courts to monitor. 
However, there was a dissenter in the Smith case. Justice 
Livingston insisted that the constitutional mandate to Congress in 
Article 1 to define the crime of piracy specifically listed piracy because 
it wanted Congress to define it with more specificity than just 
incorporating whatever the international definition happened to be.62 
That year, Congress duly amended the statute by adding three more 
parameters to the crime of piracy that included robbery of a ship, 
crew, or contents and direct as well as indirect slave-trading.63 All 
were punishable by death. 
Thus, in a thirty-year span at the beginning of this Republic, the 
United States moved from a domestic definition of piracy to an 
international one and then back again for a hybrid version. America 
had thus become one of those states possessing a more stringent 
definition (by including slave-trading) in its municipal law that the 
treatise-writers had discussed. 
And so the matter rested for 30 more years. However, the United 
States soon found itself on a war footing that would change the rules 
once more. This time, the tussle over piracy was between the 
Executive branch and the U.S. Supreme Court. At the outset of the 
American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued a 
proclamation blockading all Southern ports.64 Part of that 
proclamation was the designation of blockade runners, essentially 
Confederate sailors, as pirates,65 a legal classification the Supreme 
Court found difficult to accept: 
On April 19, 1861, Lincoln proclaimed that the crews of 
Confederate warships and privateers were pirates—a designation 
which could subject them to execution if captured. . . . In June, 
the crew of the captured Confederate ship Savannah was tried 
for piracy; but the jury disagreed, and there was no conviction. 
 
61. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 
9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
62. See Smith, 18 U.S. at 170–72.  
63. An Act to Continue to Enforce “An Act to Protect the Commerce of the 
United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy,” and Also to Make 
Further Provisions for Punishing the Crime of Piracy, ch. 113, §§ 3, 4, 3 
Stat. 600, 600–01 (1820). 
64. Proclamation 81, Declaring a Blockade of Ports in Rebellious States 
(Apr. 19, 1861), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
?pid=70101. 
65. See id. 
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[Confederate] President Davis threatened retaliation, if 
Confederate sailors were executed, by hanging some of the 
prisoners taken at Bull Run. When the crew of the Confederate 
privateer Petrel was tried for piracy in Philadelphia in 1861, 
Justice Grier of the Supreme Court declared that it was foolish 
to treat captured Confederate sailors differently from 
Confederate soldiers taken in battle, and refused to try any 
more piracy cases.66 
Eventually, the Lincoln Administration relented on this legal 
tactic to expedite the path of captured Southern sailors to the gallows 
and “reclassified blockade runners as prisoners of war a few months 
later.”67 By attempting to stretch the piracy definition to include 
rebels, President Lincoln was not acting in an unprecedented manner. 
This is the same definitional stretch the Spanish had used a century 
prior against rebels, and other European powers had accepted it, 
acting in their own self-interests.68 
The British House of Lords debated President Lincoln’s 1861 
proclamation and generally concurred that if Britain was not going to 
recognize the Confederacy, then rebels could be treated as pirates—
deferring to the judgment of the “parent state;” but this was more a 
political rather than legal question.69 Indeed, the same question had 
vexed the British during the American Revolution, and the legal 
solution adopted by Westminster was to label captured maritime 
rebels as pirates instead of prisoners of war, and detain them 
indefinitely instead of trying them.70 
 
66. CLEMENT EATON, HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY 170 (1965).  
67. John Osborne, In Philadelphia, U.S. Justice Grier Rebels Against 
Piracy Cases Interrupting U.S. District Court Business, HOUSE DIVIDED 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu/node/38130 
(citing J. THOMAS SCHARF & THOMPSON WESCOTT, HISTORY OF 
PHILADELPHIA 1609-1884, IN THREE VOLUMES, VOL. I, at 786 (1884)). See 
also WHEATON, supra note 9, at 196–97 n.84 (questioning Lincoln’s 
proclamation expanding the scope of piracy). 
68. See HALL, supra note 50, at 275 (explaining how certain insurgents 
aboard vessels were declared pirates for seemingly political reasons). 
69. See WHEATON, supra note 9, at 197 n.84 (“If the acts are sufficient to 
constitute piracy, unless the authority is a defence, the court of the 
neutral country must follow the lead of the political department of its 
government, as recognition of belligerency is a political, and not a 
judicial, question. . . . The Courts of the parent State and of the neutral 
power both follow the lead of the political department.”). 
70. Id. at 198 n.84. Of course, one cannot help but be struck by the parallel 
between the Crown treating maritime colonial rebels as non-POW 
pirates for purposes of indefinite detention, and the U.S. later treating 
Al-Qaeda terrorist suspects as non-POW terrorists for purposes of 
indefinite detention: 
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A century and a half later, America revisited the issue by split 
decisions within the Fourth Circuit. Essentially, the definitional 
choice faced by the courts came down to “robbery at sea” versus 
“violent attacks at sea.” The Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
opted for the broader violent attacks definition with the 
accompanying facilitating language, with the Ninth Circuit even 
adding aiding and abetting. 
The root of this definitional dilemma could be the fact that piracy 
co-exists as a crime domestically and internationally and has done so 
for centuries. While other heinous crimes similarly co-exist (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, torture, etc.), they are of relatively recent 
vintage. Consequently, they have not been subjected to hundreds of 
legal opinions, prosecutions, and overlapping alterations in state 
practice as has piracy. As Nussbaum notes: 
By the end of the seventeenth century, English statutory law 
developed a differentiation, later adopted by the United States, 
between “piracy jure gentium,” meaning approximately robbery 
on the high seas by private vessels, and “piracy by statute,” 
meaning similar acts (e.g., committed by rebel ships) considered 
as piratical according to particular acts of legislation. In the 
first case, the courts were ostensibly directed to apply the “law 
of nations” as such, though in reality they did so in the light of 
English conceptions.71 
 
The course pursued by the British Government during the war 
of the American Revolution seems to have been this: An Act of 
Parliament was passed (17 Geo. III. ch. 9, 1777) reciting that 
acts of treason, piracy, and felony had been committed by 
sundry persons, many of whom were, and would thereafter be, 
confined for trial on charges of such crimes, and that it might be 
inconvenient to try them forthwith, and of evil example to let 
them go at large, and authorizing the detention of such persons 
by the crown, with bail or judicial intervention, for one year. 
This act was renewed annually until the end of the war. Its 
object was to obtain a parliamentary declaration that the legal 
status of American rebels was that of felons or pirates, and to 
secure a mode of detaining them in custody without recognizing 
them as prisoners of war, or being obliged to bring them to trial 
as criminals. In the mean time, between the armies in America, 
prisoners were treated as prisoners of war, exchanged, paroled, 
&c.; and it is believed that no persons were judicially tried and 
punished as criminals during the war: and the recognition of 
independence disposed of the question.  
 Id. 
71. NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 128. 
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III.  Conclusion 
The definitional odyssey of piracy as a crime is fascinating in and 
of itself with a compelling historical trajectory across the ages, 
colorful characters associated with gripping adventures, and 
mercenary interests seeking wealth and fame. But the legal interest to 
be served here is the same legal interest to be served with other 
serious crimes like murder, treason, and robbery.  
Societies predicated on the rule of law depend on a clear, 
manageable, and precise definition of the law. This is especially true 
with respect to criminal law. Without a solid foundation provided by 
the predictable application of law, the stability of such societies 
erodes. Governments that tinker with legal definitions of crimes to 
suit their own, often short-term, interests should be discouraged from 
doing so. It is true that the law evolves over time, but it should be in 
a determined and beneficial manner. 
Perhaps a better, and more uniform, method for trying pirates 
would be to create a venue within the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.72 If all the parties to UNCLOS 
agreed to this venue using a single definition of piracy, then it would 
not matter whether they were also state parties to the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. They could simply turn over alleged pirates and all 
accompanying evidence to the court, or a chamber of the court, which 
might happen to be sitting somewhere in East Africa or around the 
Indian Ocean. This would also obviate the judicial gymnastics 
encountered when dueling definitions of the crime are available. 
As it now stands, however, Black Bart was correct that any state 
that could catch him could “hang” him since he was a pirate. 
However, whether a prosecution would succeed today is a separate 
question. Once jurisdiction is asserted, a broader or narrower 
conception of piracy would be used to try him in court, and that 
could determine entirely whether he swings from the yardarm or gets 
off the hook! 
 
72. See generally Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case 
for Including Piracy Within the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 201 (2010) (arguing that the 
ICC is the best international legal forum to address piracy offenses). 
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